

Competitive Strategies and Soviet Vulnerabilities

GARY L. GUERTNER

"By examining their military organization, their leadership . . . , and even the broader trends in their society such as . . . demographics, we will not only know our enemy better, we will be able to attend to his weaknesses more effectively."

—Caspar W. Weinberger¹

Scarcity is the midwife of good strategy. Scarcity also explains the new emphasis on "competitive strategy" in Secretary of Defense Weinberger's recent Annual Reports to the Congress (FY 1987-88). Recognizing the economic impracticality of returning to the dominant position enjoyed by the United States in the 1950s and early 1960s, Weinberger's competitive strategies initiative seeks to align enduring US strengths against enduring Soviet weaknesses. It is a call to use strategy more effectively, offsetting deficit-driven budget constraints through the efficient use of resources. The concept promises to be just as relevant under Secretary of Defense Frank Carlucci, who will operate in an even more resource-constrained environment than Weinberger.

Strategy, by definition, is competitive. Revisiting fundamentals can, nevertheless, open useful avenues to new strategic thinking provided that our approach goes beyond short-term issues such as the military balance, technology, and order of battle. Only when we know our enemy completely—historically, geographically, culturally, economically, psychologically, politically—can we attend his weaknesses effectively. This article identifies a significant Soviet vulnerability through an examination of Soviet geopolitics. Assessing the geopolitical order reveals enduring Soviet political liabilities that strengthen the credibility of US nuclear deterrence—even in a world where the Soviets may enjoy numerical superiority.

The strategic debate has been dominated by the visible indicators of military power—delivery vehicles, warheads, throw-weight, and accuracy, for example. These quantifiable threats have been cast in scenarios

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illustrating US vulnerability and Soviet first-strike capabilities. Both the arms competition and the limited attempts to contain it through arms control negotiations have been dominated by technical issues and their relationship to strategy. Strategy and the stability of our nuclear deterrent must be viewed across a wider spectrum of variables if destabilizing trends in either force structure or strategy are to be avoided and the arms competition they foster is to be checked. Technical capabilities must be linked more precisely with the full range of threats faced by each country. These include the geopolitical, economic, ethnographic, and even the historical variables that influence the calculus of Soviet strategic planning. Soviet sensitivity to homeland defense is far more complex than is generally recognized in Western discussion of nuclear deterrence and war.

Homeland defense requires more than a robust capability to guard Soviet borders and maintain territorial integrity. In Soviet eyes, a credible homeland defense must also:

- Maintain ethnic Russian domination of a multinational state.
- Maintain Communist Party control of both the ethnic Russian heartland and the strategically located, non-Russian union republics which make up the USSR.
- Maintain the current political elite's personal control of the Communist Party.
- Provide the military forces which give the Soviet Union superpower status.

The first two of these four interrelated security objectives are unique to the Soviet state. They are unique by virtue of the anachronistic style of Soviet communism—a relic of 19th-century Western political thought that has fastened tenaciously onto the 20th century's last remaining empire. This empire was forged over several centuries under the Russian czardom, which successfully acquired power to take the offensive against waves of invaders who had repeatedly subjugated Russia. Centered in a vast geographic area which lacked natural frontiers or defensive barriers, the czars both defended the state and satisfied personal ambitions for power by expanding Russian frontiers. The results of this expansion are seen today in the administrative structure of the USSR. Its 15 union republics are organized around the Soviet Union's dominant ethnic and cultural groupings—the “nationalities” as Soviet officials describe them.

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**Projected Ethnic Makeup of
Soviet Draft-Age Males, by Percentage**

	1985	1990	2000	2010	2050
Russians	47	46.9	43.9	40.3	37.7
All Others	53	53.1	56.1	59.7	62.3

Source: W. Ward Kingkade, "Estimates and Projections of the USSR by Major Nationality: 1979 to 2050," CIR Staff Paper, Center for International Research, Bureau of the Census, Washington, D.C., January 1986, p. 40.

Maintaining ethnic Russian control of the nationalities is one of the most serious strategic challenges to Soviet leaders in both war and peace. Yet geopolitical vulnerabilities to societal disruption and political fragmentation are among the least-examined variables in the assessments of Soviet military power and risk-taking. Western strategic literature treats the Soviet Union as a unitary state, powerful in its military and political potential to threaten the United States and its allies. Little has been done to examine the multinational character of the Soviet state and its potential effect on Soviet-American mutual deterrence.

Ethnic Russians soon will comprise a minority of the Soviet population.² They are concentrated in the center of the USSR (the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic or RSFSR, one of the 15 Soviet republics), and are buffered from neighboring countries by union republics populated predominantly by non-Russian ethnic groups. Most important, many of these ethnic minorities have long histories of political independence. How Soviet leaders have managed pressures for autonomy or independence by these groups during periods of crisis or national stress tells us a great deal about Soviet perceptions and sensitivity toward these points of vulnerability. World War I and the Bolshevik revolution, for example, led to temporary independence for some ethnic groups, which later had to be forcibly reintegrated by the Red Army. Similarly, during World War II Stalin relocated entire ethnic populations to the interior of the country for fear that they might collaborate with the Germans. Nor was this fear unwarranted. Many groups did defect in large numbers, taking up arms on the German side. As the German armies moved through the Ukraine and Byelorussia, they were conquering regions that had been most cruelly hit during the 1930s by forced collectivization, famine, and Stalin's Russification policies. Had the Germans given humane and moderate treatment to the Soviet nationalities in these areas, their occupation could have become a danger to the Soviet system even after the German retreat. One can only speculate as to what additional problems the Soviets would have encountered had Hitler in 1941 proclaimed the independence of the

Ukraine, Byelorussia, and the Baltic states. According to Adam Ulam, the Soviets' continuous demands for a second front in Europe, even when the Germans could no longer win in the east, were prompted by the urgent necessity of reconquering Soviet territories before any form of anti-Soviet organization could take root.³ As it was, pockets of anti-Soviet partisans in these areas resisted the Soviet army for several years following the German surrender in 1945.⁴

More recently the resurgence of Islam in combination with increased ethnic nationalism on or near the Soviet border has increased the possibility that the Soviet Union's own Islamic and minority populations in the areas bordering Iran and Afghanistan may in the future press for greater autonomy. Once set in motion, the pressures of nationalism could start several ethnic dominoes falling out of control.

Parallels can be drawn between the Soviet invasions of Afghanistan and Czechoslovakia. Soviet sensitivity to events in Iran and Afghanistan is undoubtedly heightened by the potential impact of political and religious ferment in these areas upon Soviet Islamic citizens in Central Asia. A similar situation existed in Czechoslovakia where reforms had an unsettling effect on autonomy-minded Ukrainian nationalists.⁵ The Ukraine had developed close cultural and economic links with Czechoslovakia. This, in combination with a small Ukrainian population in Slovakia,⁶ resulted in greater Ukrainian exposure to the reformist and nationalistic ideas expressed in Czechoslovakia. This exposure, superimposed upon indigenous nationalism, resulted in a breakdown of the official Soviet monopoly of the means of public communication and political indoctrination. According to the "Ukrainian hypothesis," no "mental frontier" separated the Czechoslovak crisis from the Ukrainian problem in the thinking of Soviet officials.⁷ The nationality problem played a dominant role in shaping the Soviet decision to invade and crush the "Prague Spring," and these same perceptions may also have influenced Soviet decisions toward Polish dissent. According to this thesis,

Czechoslovakia would have appeared in the mind's eye of the Soviet leadership as a union republic in which the "bourgeois nationalists" were actually getting away with what "they" were trying to do in the Ukraine The definition of and response to the Czechoslovak situation . . . would be considered from *this* perspective as a projection outward of a campaign underway already in the Ukraine and other national republics to combat local nationalism and anti-Russianism. The critical factor here would be the cognitive impact that Ukrainian dissent had presumably already made upon the Soviet leadership.⁸

The precise relationship between contemporary Soviet domestic and foreign policies cannot be stated without firsthand knowledge of Soviet

decisionmaking. Whatever the linkage may prove to be, there is little doubt that Soviet domestic vulnerabilities are taken into account during times of crisis and play a role in Soviet assessments of both their conventional and strategic force requirements. The nationalities issue is especially significant in assessing Soviet vulnerability to nuclear war.

Strategic Implications of the Nationalities

Nationalism in the union republics remains a problem for Soviet leaders much as it was for their czarist predecessors. Marxist-Leninism has not produced a melting pot for proletarian internationalism even within the borders of the USSR. Under Stalin, the rhetoric of "friendship of peoples" characterized the federal structure of the USSR, masking both his ability and willingness to deal harshly with troublesome and untrustworthy non-Russians in the Soviet borderlands. Khrushchev reopened the "nationalities problem" by emphasizing the need to equalize rates of economic development and provide equal opportunities for all Soviet nationalities. His "affirmative action" policies stressed building communism and *merging* all Soviet nations into a higher community—"the Soviet People." Under Brezhnev, less ambitious attitudes emerged in discussions of the new Soviet constitution. For example, in a remarkably candid public confession published in 1977, Brezhnev admitted that the "merging" of the Soviet nationalities had given way to "rapprochement" and declared that "we would be entering a dangerous path if we were to artificially force the objective process of the rapprochement of nations." Instead, he foresaw a long-range process of "nations drawing together."

Yuri Andropov displayed great sensitivity to the nationalities question during his brief tenure. He reasserted the Leninist idea of a merger of nationalities as the long-term goal, but emphasized economic integration and equality rather than ideology as the primary vehicle for national cohesion. Thus national distinctions would exist longer than class distinctions. Moreover, Andropov warned that economic progress among the various nationalities would inevitably be accompanied by the growth of national self-awareness. Ethnic pride, he cautioned, should not degenerate into ethnic or regional arrogance. Economic progress and the migration of population required for labor mobility (and control) have made each republic more multinational. This means the party and government "must carry forward lofty principles" to ensure harmonious and fraternal relations among ethnic groups.¹⁰

Mikhail Gorbachev has not addressed the nationalities question in a way suggesting that the issue is at the forefront of his concerns. The problem has been secondary to his broader goals of economic reforms and progress. In his drive for economic efficiency, Gorbachev has shown impatience with the "parasitic attitudes" of some republics.¹¹ This impatience

could be seen in his sacking of Dinmukhamed Kunaev, the local party chief and full Politburo member from the republic Kazakhstan. Riots followed in the capital city of Alma Ata after Kunaev was replaced by an ethnic Russian.

There is evidence that the riots were encouraged by local party members who feared with good reason that the fall of their patron would cost them their positions.¹² Local resentment, however extensive, seems to have been effectively dissipated by the new leadership's ability to quickly get meat and vegetables in state stores. Previously, one-third of Alma Ata's food supply and 80 percent of its housing had been siphoned off for the party and state elite. An honest Russian who can show results may be preferable to a corrupt ethnic kinsman. Gorbachev has clearly stated his preference for economic efficiency even at the cost of local ethnic resentment at reforms which sweep local leadership away. Nevertheless, there are risks, and, as the riots demonstrate, ethnic sensitivities can be easily manipulated. *Glasnost*, or greater openness, may lead to greater ethnic identification and assertiveness—a trend not welcomed by hard-liners concerned with maintaining Russian control.¹³

Changes in economic and social conditions may, as Andropov feared, increase ethnic identification and resentment of assimilationist pressures from central authority. Increases in ethnic tensions seem more probable than wishful Soviet predictions of "nations drawing together" unless Soviet leaders are skillful enough to avoid the tensions produced by ethnic Russian domination of political and economic institutions.

From the Soviet perspective there are additional unsettling precedents in their foreign policy which inadvertently foster nationalism among their own minorities. Support for the Arabs after the 1967 war against Israel, for instance, was a significant factor in provoking a resurgence of Jewish nationalism and the desire for increased emigration. By the same token, success of Jews in establishing their right to emigrate (however limited) has stimulated a similar cause among Baltic Germans.¹⁴ Confronted by a pattern of non-Russian self-assertiveness, assisted perhaps by the US human rights campaign, Soviet officials may well speculate that today's emigrant could be tomorrow's separatist. Similarly, Moscow's support for national liberation movements has also boomeranged to some extent. Many nationalist writings have pointed to the incongruity between Soviet foreign and domestic policies.¹⁵ There is no small irony in the world's largest multinational state—or, more accurately, empire-state—being the leading spokesman for national liberation movements.

None of these indicators proves that the disintegration of the Soviet Union is an immediate or even long-term prospect. The Soviet government shows every indication of being able to deal with its internal problems. But how these problems would pose themselves during periods of crisis and convulsive societal disruption are an entirely different matter.

War, and most particularly nuclear war and its aftermath, require a unity of effort that some fear might be lacking even in the United States. The Soviet problem would be far more complex and uncertain.

The military aspects of Soviet integration policy (i.e. Russification) provide clues about doubts Soviet officials may harbor concerning the loyalty of their nationalities during crisis. Major combat units of the army are dominated numerically and administratively by ethnic Russians. Less-skilled minority recruits are more likely to be assigned to support roles. In most instances, the latter are garrisoned at bases outside their homelands.¹⁶ No nationality group has large concentrations of native troops stationed on its own soil. This was common practice even before the new Soviet constitution formally dropped the union republics' right to possess their own armed forces. In short, the ethnic dispersal of the Soviet army often results in colonial-like occupation patterns in many areas where troops find themselves in a social milieu, climate, and culture sharply at variance with their own. In turn, they are sometimes regarded with disdain by the people whose territories they occupy—even within the USSR.¹⁷

Party-government administrative control in non-Russian areas is also structured to check the emergence of autonomy-minded local bureaucrats. First or second party secretaries are nearly always ethnic Russians in whose hands resides ultimate decisionmaking power, as well as control over recruitment of local administrators.¹⁸ Russian-dominated local bureaucracies have been accompanied by large influxes of Great Russians into urban areas where they have dominated the process of modernization and industrialization, and have benefited disproportionately from the higher living standards that result.¹⁹ These patterns seem likely to increase ethnic tensions, especially in the immediate future, as the Soviets are forced to deal with a declining labor force in the RSFSR. Their choices include expanding industry in non-Russian republics where labor is more plentiful, as against bringing more minority labor into the predominately Great Russian RSFSR. Either option risks increasing domestic tensions in a nation that has always seen a close relationship between domestic stability and military power.

Implications for US Strategy

Conducting offensive operations while maintaining a stable home front may place unique pressures on the Soviet Communist Party and the general staff. Surely any responsible leadership would harbor the gravest doubts as to the adequacy of Soviet strategic and conventional forces to underwrite the enormous wartime demands placed on them by Soviet doctrine. As Benjamin Lambeth has pointed out, "Because . . . obligations place open-ended demands on Soviet force availability, performance, and durability, the Soviet leaders can never feel so complacent about the

adequacy of their preparedness efforts as to permit any prolonged resting on their strategic oars."²⁰ Lambeth's observations are in sharp contrast with the often-repeated belief that Soviet military preparedness goes far beyond legitimate defense requirements. If correct, Soviet notions of "sufficiency" and "homeland defense" are inevitably going to be considerably more ambitious than their American counterparts. "Mother Russia" (the RSFSR) is surrounded by non-Russian republics, which are bordered by subservient but unreliable allies who are, in turn, surrounded by hostile neighbors and military alliances. These combined threats to Soviet security may do more to strengthen the credibility of US deterrence while undermining the Soviet appetite for risk-taking than any variant of military hardware or technical capability. At best, nuclear weapons and large conventional forces are an imperfect means of compensating for the geopolitical liabilities unique to the Soviet state. These liabilities place serious constraints on the use of Soviet strategic forces as tools that can be employed in planned ways to coerce concessions from an adversary, or that might tempt Soviet leaders to reckless and inflexible positions during crises.

Nevertheless, there is little doubt that the Soviet strategic buildup since the 1960s has contributed to important changes in US strategic doctrine and force structure. The size and characteristics of US strategic forces have been determined by the requirements for putting at risk specific Soviet target categories. What those targets should be is often the subject of vigorous debate. One reasonable objective presumably agreed on by all participants is the erosion or elimination of Soviet confidence in military solutions to crisis. As Colin Gray has put it, "One of the essential tasks of the American defense community is to help ensure that in moments of acute crisis the Soviet general staff cannot brief the Politburo with a plausible theory of victory."²¹

In sum, a Soviet decision to go to war requires much more than the military confidence of the general staff. The Soviet calculus requires political, social, and economic confidence as well. This presents US strategists with a broad deterrence spectrum in threatening those interrelated values that will most credibly prevent Gray's "victory" briefing from becoming plausible. What kinds of threats would have the most deterring effect on the Soviet leadership? The Soviets' nationalities problem is relevant to US strategy. The non-Russian populations are a political center of gravity for the cohesion and integrity of the state. They are also a center of gravity in any Western pre-war deterrence or wartime strategy aimed at disrupting the Soviet rear. There are parallels here with counterinsurgency. Insurgents depend on the population for their long-term success. A besieged government must draw support from that same population if it is to survive and defeat an insurgency. Thus insurgents and government have the same center of gravity. In both counterinsurgency and strategic nuclear war, a

common dilemma in formulating strategy is how to attack an enemy without threatening a center of gravity which is important to your own success. In the present case, the Baltic natives, Ukrainians, Central Asians, Georgians, and other ethnic groups are not the enemy. Indeed, they are the potential vehicles for disrupting the Soviet rear. Attacking them directly would be as counterproductive as inflicting widespread and indiscriminate civilian casualties in counterinsurgency operations.

The military-economic center of gravity in the USSR is that section of the RSFSR from its Western boundaries to the Urals. Here is concentrated the largest percentage of ethnic Russians, ICBM installations, naval facilities, bomber bases, heavy industry, communications, and transportation facilities. The threat of assured and concentrated retaliation against the RSFSR confronts Soviet leaders with the prospects of a radically altered domestic and international balance of power.

For the Soviets, recovery would be complicated by political problems they would confront in the presumably less-damaged non-Russian republics. Could the economically linked but physically less-damaged zones be counted on for recovery assistance as in the case of other localized disaster recovery efforts? Or would scarcity and chaos further stimulate the centrifugal forces of nationalism and separatism? Many of the outlying union republics served their buffer functions well in World War II, absorbing the initial damage and destruction by the German army. In a nuclear war, the reverse may be true. The central Great Russian zones (RSFSR) could receive immediate and highly concentrated levels of damage.

The evolution of US nuclear strategy toward flexibility, proportionality, and controlled responses has produced a force structure that is capable of some level of political discrimination.²² This does not mean that credible deterrence demands extensive threats to Soviet industry or Russian population centers. The destruction of essential choke-points in a highly interdependent economic system would effectively shut down industrial production, even if many plants and industrial centers survived. Soviet sensitivity to threats aimed at the industrial infrastructure which supports its superpower status, combined with its strategic perception that long wars require a stable political and economic base, suggests that limited nuclear threats may be an effective (but, thus far, insufficiently explored) means for achieving both stable and credible deterrence and strategic arms reductions.

The Soviets, understandably, do not openly discuss the link between the nationalities question and strategic vulnerability in war. Their actions, however, indicate that the leadership harbors serious misgivings about the crisis loyalty of many Soviet minorities. If so, these doubts contribute to Soviet self-deterrence and a preference for low risk-taking in crises involving the threat of confrontation with US strategic forces.²³ It is not in the American interest to shine too bright a light on Soviet nationality

problems. There would be a significant danger and probable Soviet backlash if American officials initiated widespread discussion of Soviet ethnic vulnerabilities with no accompanying restraints in the form of offensive arms control and general improvements in Soviet-American relations. Their heightened perception of US hostility could easily prompt countermeasures and an escalation of the arms race. Competitive strategy should not lock the United States into futile action-reaction spirals that do little to increase security.

Recognition of Soviet weaknesses and their impact on Soviet homeland defense serves to strengthen confidence in and the credibility of existing US strategic doctrine and force structure. If and when that force structure declines as the result of arms control agreements, greater efforts will be required to maintain deterrence and economy of force. This will require a more precise definition of the Soviet centers of gravity. Linking deterrence strategies and Soviet multinationalism is one possible approach under the Administration's competitive strategies initiative.

The Soviets are fully aware of their enduring political liabilities. These liabilities provide a considerable Soviet incentive for superpower stability (peaceful coexistence). If and when the Soviet leadership shows a preference for conflict, the preference would most likely flow from perceptions of conventional superiority. The most productive arena for competitive strategies, therefore, is at the conventional force level, where Soviet advantages reduce the self-deterring pressure found in Soviet nuclear risk-taking behavior.

Competitive strategies against Soviet conventional forces require long-range perspectives that integrate military and diplomatic objectives. Arms control agreements, for example, may radically alter force structures on both sides. If the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces Treaty is followed by negotiations to reduce conventional forces, competitive strategies should play a central role in the formulation of the US negotiating position.

The USSR's most enduring weakness is its political and economic structure. The Gorbachev domestic agenda may signal a new, more cooperative phase in Soviet-American relations and ultimately a stronger, more competitive Soviet industrial base. No one can say whether a rehabilitated Soviet socioeconomic system would spawn a more assertive foreign policy or a status-quo mentality anxious to preserve the benefits of reduced tensions abroad and higher living standards at home. In a world of uncertainties, competitive strategy for the United States ultimately means the patient but long-term maintenance of credible military forces and aggressive political efforts to improve Soviet-American relations on all fronts. Success in both is the surest and perhaps the only road to affordable deterrence, strategic stability, and a world that is more secure for both nuclear superpowers.

NOTES

1. *Annual Report to the Congress, FY 1987* (Washington: GPO, 1986), pp. 86-87.
2. Some experts had predicted that the 1979 census would show ethnic Russians to be a minority. The published Soviet statistics showed ethnic Russians as 52.4 percent of the population. Murray Feshbach of Georgetown University's Center for Population Research predicts that figure will fall to 48 percent by the year 2000.
3. Adam Ulam, *Expansion and Coexistence: Soviet Foreign Policy 1917-73* (2nd ed.; New York: Praeger, 1974), pp. 326-27.
4. Reported in *The New York Times*, 19 April 1946, p. 19; 15 May 1949, p. 1; 26 July 1949, p. 9; and 1 May 1950, p. 10.
5. Grey Hodnett and Peter Potichnyi, *The Ukraine and the Czechoslovak Crisis* (Canberra, Australia: Australian National Univ., 1970). For a more recent study of the Ukraine as pivotal to Soviet ethnic policies, see Alexander J. Motyl, *Will the Non-Russians Rebel?* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell Univ. Press, 1987).
6. The number would be greater had Stalin not annexed Polish territory in 1939 and the Carpatho-Ukraine in 1945, thereby extending the Soviet border to Czechoslovakia and Hungary, thus facilitating the projection of military power into those countries and minimizing future conflicts that might arise between Ukrainians and Eastern Europeans.
7. Hodnett and Potichnyi, pp. 121-25.
8. *Ibid.*, pp. 124-25.
9. Quoted in A. Shtromas, "The Legal Position of Soviet Nationalities and their Territorial Units According to the 1977 Constitution of the USSR," *Russian Review*, 37 (July 1978), 272.
10. Extensive treatment of the nationalities was given during his speech before the Supreme Soviet celebrating the 60th anniversary of the USSR. Reprinted in *Reprints from the Soviet Press*, Vol. 32, No. 1 (15 January 1983), 8-18.
11. For an assessment of Gorbachev's policies toward the nationalities, see the analysis of his speech before the 27th Party Congress by Roman Solchanyk ("Does Gorbachev Have a Nationalities Policy?" *Radio Free Europe-Radio Liberty* RL 112/86, 7 March 1986).
12. *The Washington Post*, 22 February 1987, p. A1.
13. There may be good reasons for Soviet concern. Riots in Alma Ata were followed by protesting Crimean Tartars in Moscow who called on Gorbachev to restore the Crimean homeland from which they were deported by Stalin in the 1940s. Thousands of demonstrators also poured into the streets of capital cities in Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia protesting the 1939 Nazi-Soviet Pact that permitted a Soviet takeover of the region. See *The Washington Post*, 9 August 1987, pp. A1, A24; 27 August 1987, p. A1.
14. Julian Birch, "The Persistence of Nationalism in the USSR," *Journal of Social and Political Affairs*, 1 (January 1976), 75.
15. *Ibid.*, p. 72.
16. Jeremy Azrael, *Emergent Nationality Problems in the USSR*, R-2172-AF (Santa Monica, Calif.: Rand, September 1977), pp. 16-22; and Sig Mickelson, "USSR Muslim Population Explosion Poses Possible Threat to Soviet Military," *Military Review*, 58 (November 1978), 39. See also Susan Curran and Dmitry Ponomareff, *Managing the Ethnic Factor in The Russian and Soviet Armed Forces* (Santa Monica, Calif.: Rand, 1982).
17. Mickelson, p. 39.
18. John H. Miller, "Cadres Policy in Nationality Areas: Recruitment of CPSU First and Second Secretaries in Non-Russian Republics of the USSR," *Soviet Studies*, 29 (January 1977), 8, 12, 18.
19. Robert Lewis and Richard Rowland, "East is West and West is East . . . Population Redistribution in the Soviet Union and its Impact on Soviet Nationalities," *International Migration Review*, 11 (Spring 1977), 6, 11.
20. Benjamin S. Lambeth, "The Political Potential of Soviet Equivalence," *International Security*, 4 (Fall 1979), 37.
21. Colin Gray, "Nuclear Strategy: A Case for a Theory of Victory," *International Security*, 4 (Summer 1979), 56.
22. For a summary of US doctrinal evolution, see Leon Sloss and Marc Millot, "U.S. Nuclear Strategy in Evolution," *Strategic Review*, 12 (Winter 1984), 19-28. A more detailed history is provided in Fred Kaplan, *The Wizards of Armageddon* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983) and Desmond Ball and Jeffrey Richelson, eds., *Strategic Nuclear Targeting* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell Univ. Press, 1986).
23. There is nothing in the public record that shows the Soviets have ever placed their strategic nuclear forces on alert during a crisis.